Curriculum Vitae – Joseph Millum

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Academic History

Sept 2006 – present:	Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Clinical Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, Maryland, USA
Oct 2005 – May 2006:	SGS Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of Toronto, Canada.
Sept 2000 – Oct 2005:	Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Canada. Dissertation title: *The Adaptation of Morality*. Supervisor: Dr Paul Thompson (Philosophy and Zoology). Readers: Dr L. Wayne Sumner, Dr Philip Clark. Internal Appraiser: Dr Ronald de Sousa. External Appraiser: Dr Alexander Rosenberg.
Oct 1995 – June 1999:	University of Edinburgh, UK. MA Hons in Philosophy: First Class.
June 1998 – Sept 1998:	Dartmouth College, New Hampshire, USA. GPA: 4.0

Area of Specialization
Moral philosophy

Areas of Competence
Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Biology, Bioethics

Journal Publications
'Natural Goodness and Natural Evil'. *Ratio 19: 2* (June 2006)

Book Reviews
W.H. Harms (2004), *Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes* (in *Philosophy in Review*, *26: 3* (June 2006))
A. Taylor (2003), *Animals and Ethics* (in *The Peer Review*, Winter 2004)

Papers Under Consideration
'A Biological Alternative to Moral Explanations'
'An Investment Theory of Parenthood'

Conference Presentations
Papers
October 2006:	Western Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Conference - 'An Investment Theory of Parenthood'
May/June 2006:	Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress 2006 - 'The Incest Prohibition: A Counter-example to Evolutionary Naturalism'
May/June 2005:	Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress 2005 - 'Moral vs. Biological Explanations'
April 2005:	American Philosophical Association Central Division Annual Meeting 2005 - 'Moral Realism and Natural Kinds'
May/June 2004:	Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress 2004 - 'A Functional Foot?'
April 2004:	University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Annual Graduate Conference 2004 - 'A Functional Foot?'
April 2004:	University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point: Values, Rational Choice and the Will - 'A Functional Foot?'
May/June 2003:	Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress 2003 - 'How to Derive a Moral 'Ought' from a Biological 'Is''
April 2003:	University of Montreal Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy - 'Legislating for Moral Distress in a Multi-cultural Society'
April 2003:	The International Society for Utilitarian Studies: Utilitarianism, Human Rights and Globalization - 'The Harm of Moral Distress'

Commentaries
May/June 2004:	Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress 2004 Commentary on 'Hare-raising Truth Conditions' by Mark Gardiner
May 2004:	University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy 2004 Commentary on 'Revisiting Harman: Setting Fire to a Can of Worms' by Deborah Mower
May/June 2003:	Canadian Philosophical Association Annual Congress 2003 Commentary on 'Theories of Virtue and Vice' by Todd Calder
May 2002:	University of Toronto Graduate Conference in Philosophy 2002 Commentary on 'State, Anarchy, and Culture' by Stefan Cojocaru

Awards

2005/2006:	University of Toronto, SGS Post-Doctoral Fellowship
2004/2005:	Nomination: TATP Teaching Assistants Excellence Award
June 2004:	1st Place, Canadian Philosophical Association Student Essay Prize
2003/2004:	Winner, Martha Lile Love Teaching Award, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto.
2003/2004:	George Paxton Young Memorial prize, University of Toronto
2002/2003:	George Paxton Young Memorial prize, University of Toronto
2001 – 2005:	University of Toronto Fellowship
2000/2001:	Beatty Fellowship, University of Toronto
June 1999:	University of Edinburgh Philosophy of Science Prize
June 1999:	University of Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Prize
June 1998:	Bruce of Grange Scholarship to study at Dartmouth College, NH.
June 1997:	University of Edinburgh Logic Prize

Graduate Courses taken at the University of Toronto

Meta-ethics (Checkland)
Philosophy of Science – Emergence (Seager)
Descartes (Gombay)
Marxism (Goldstick)
Philosophy of Science (Thompson)
Philosophy of Biology (de Sousa)
Kant – Critique of Pure Reason (Morrison)
Kant – Ethics (Tenenbaum)
Philosophy of Law (Sumner)
Philosophy of Science – Space and Time (Brown)
Reading Course – Philosophy of Biology (Thompson)
Reading Course – Evolutionary Ethics (Thompson)

Graduate Courses audited at the University of Toronto

Meta-ethics (Clark)
Philosophy of Action (Tenenbaum)
Philosophy of Biology (de Sousa)
Applied Ethics – Coercion, Exploitation, Commodification (Hawkins)

Service and Other Activities

2006:	Referee, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*
Fall 2005:	Research Assistant for Prof. Gopal Sreenivasan (on the psychology of emotions)
2001 - 2004:	Organising Committee Member and Referee, University of Toronto Annual Graduate Conference in Philosophy
2001 - 2004:	Treasurer, Graduate Philosophy Students Union
2003 - present:	Member, Canadian Philosophical Association
2004 - present:	Member, American Philosophical Association Member

Teaching Experience

Course Instructorships
Spring 2006:   PHLC06H3 S Topics in Ethical Theory
Fall 2005:   PHL252H5 F Philosophy of Science
Spring 2004:   PHL255H5 S Science and Pseudo-science
Fall 2003:   PHL252H5 F Philosophy of Science

Teaching Assistantships
Tutorial Leader
Summer 2005:   PHL384HF Ethics, Genetics and Reproduction
Winter 2004/5:   PHL281Y Bioethics
Summer 2003:   PHL100Y Introduction to Philosophy
Spring 2003:   PHL193HS Science and Social Issues
Winter 2002/3:   PHL100Y Introduction to Philosophical Problems
Summer 2002   PHL245HF Modern Symbolic Logic
Winter 2001/2   PHL100Y Introduction to Philosophical Problems

Grading
Grading in formal logic, critical reasoning, and all of the above listed courses.

Teacher training
THE500H1 Teaching in Higher Education. A semester-long course dealing with all aspects of pedagogy in universities.

Academic References

Prof. Jacqueline Brunning, University of Toronto
Prof. Philip Clark, University of Toronto
Prof. Ronald de Sousa, University of Toronto
Prof. Thomas Hurka, University of Toronto
Prof. Philip Kremer, University of Toronto
Prof. L. Wayne Sumner, University of Toronto
Prof. Paul Thompson, University of Toronto

The Adaptation of Morality – Thesis Abstract

My thesis demonstrates the relevance of an evolutionary biological understanding of human beings to issues in different domains of value theory. The final goal of the thesis is the development and application of a biology-based methodology for resolving otherwise intractable disagreements in normative ethics. This methodology is premised on an anti-realist meta-ethics, and the claim that the moral systems of the dominant culture of Anglo-American society include such disagreements. Consequently, along the way I use findings in evolutionary biology and moral psychology to argue against moral realism and to argue that there are likely to be such disagreements. Thus a corollary of my thesis is that it implies an important relationship between meta-ethics and normative ethics. Unusually, for a project in evolutionary ethics, my conclusions do not require the deduction of normative statements from descriptive statements; nor do I claim that we should endorse objects because they are the products of evolution by natural selection.

I begin by developing an evolutionary biological model of the origins of the human moral apparatus and the sets of moral rules that accompany it. I argue that humans have evolved to preferentially internalize moral rules that stipulate mutually advantageous payoffs to participants in situations with the form of prisoner's dilemmas. Importantly, the fruits of cooperation in such situations can vary considerably while keeping cooperation in the interests of all. This variation explains variation in moral rules and underlies important aspects of the normative arguments that follow. I partially confirm the biological model by generating predictions from it that I test against findings in moral psychology and other social scientific disciplines.

Using the biological model and psychological theories I develop meta-analyses of moral discourse that imply that moral systems like ours will contain disagreements which are *intractable*. This means that certain disagreements will remain after the moral principles of the disputing parties have been subjected to rational scrutiny and all the facts are known that are relevant to whether the situation judged falls under those principles.

If there were moral facts that determined the truth value of moral judgements it looks like moral disagreements should be tractable. Consequently, to defend my thesis of intractable moral disagreement I argue against moral realism that it is either false or fails to guarantee a resolution to moral disagreements. The evolutionary biological model explains moral beliefs in a way which facilitates a genetic argument: if the explanation of the origins of a belief makes no reference to the truth of the belief then that belief is unjustified. I suggest that realists can avoid the genetic argument by adopting either naturalism or a form of response-dependent realism. If moral facts are natural facts, then evidence for their existence must be provided by showing that they are needed in the best explanations of some phenomena. I argue that evolutionary biology suggests a possible natural kind that plays the explanatory role the posited moral kind would play. However, this biological kind would underdetermine the content of moral judgements, and so cannot itself be a moral kind. Response-dependent realism ties the truth of moral judgements to the responses of certain agents. I argue that this position collapses either into one of the previous forms of response-independent realism, or into relativism, depending on whether the responses are those of ideal or actual agents.

Finally, I develop a novel biology-based methodology to assist with the criticism and amending of moral rules in cases of moral disagreement. I argue that examining the cultural function of rules and considering their consequences for the long-term genetic fitness of members of a population may provide normative guidance. I apply this methodology to the incest taboo, concluding that it is outmoded and should be replaced with more adaptive rules governing sexual abuse and abuses of trust.

Summary of Current Research Projects

I am currently engaged in three lines of research. One is primarily meta-ethical; the other two mainly address issues in normative ethics.

My meta-ethics research concentrates on problems concerning moral realism, particularly naturalism. I have explored and rejected various strategies by which philosophers try to justify moral judgements by reference to natural facts. One such strategy is to argue that evidence for the existence of moral facts is given by their role in explanations of certain phenomena. I argued against this in my dissertation. An alternative is Philippa Foot's attempt to link our moral evaluations to our evaluations of living creatures more generally. I argued against this in the paper, 'Natural Goodness and Natural Evil'. A third strategy is exemplified by recent evolutionary ethicists such as Robert Richards and Edward O Wilson who try to ground moral principles in evolved human moral sentiments. I am currently re-writing a paper which argues that any such theory will lead to unacceptable normative conclusions. This work develops themes that began in my Ph.D. thesis and makes use of the evolutionary biological models developed there. It continues the project of arguing against a 'discovery' and in favour of a 'creation' model of moral discourse. In time I intend to examine how the methods of normative ethics, such as the process of reflective equilibrium, should be affected by the adoption of such a model.

In normative ethics I am working on moral parenthood, that is, the rights over and duties towards their children that parents are commonly held to possess. I have developed an account of the acquisition of parental rights according to which the rights are generated by putting in parenting work. This theory can be helpful in cases where people are competing for the privilege of parenting a child. When, instead, someone does not want to care for a child, issues surrounding parental responsibility become pressing. My current project concerns the origins of parental responsibilities. I am concerned, in particular, with paternal responsibility in cases where the biological father of a child had no intention of procreating and took active steps to reduce the probability of conception. In such cases, it has been argued, our moral theory and practice come apart. In theory, the efforts the man makes to avoid conception should substantially mitigate the extent of his responsibility. However, in practice biological fathers are held fully responsible when their intentional actions lead to pregnancy (excepting the case of sperm donation). I will argue that the social conventions that govern parenting affect the appropriateness of ascribing responsibility, and this makes it reasonable to hold such men responsible.

Finally, I am in the early stages of a mentored project at the National Institutes of Health. This project concerns the relationship between human rights and health care. In contemporary literature on poverty reduction, development, and global health it is common to find exhortations to use a human rights framework in addressing problems. In the domain of health care provision, these problems include whether people are owed health care and by whom, and how much health care is owed and how it should be distributed. I am interested in what, if anything, a human rights strategy adds to attempted solutions to these problems. One approach I will take is to consider case studies, such as the recent South African litigation concerning the government's denial of HIV/AIDS treatment and its relevance to a constitutional right to health. Another will be to start at a foundational level, with justificatory moral theories of human rights and examine what they should say about the possibility and content of a human right to health. This may then be contrasted with the right as laid out in international, regional and national human rights documents. In the end I hope to map out more clearly the pragmatic and justificatory uses (and misuses) of human rights discourse, and so provide guidance to other researchers regarding the appropriate tools for addressing philosophical issues arising from issues of global health care.